Strengthening Vigilance Against Suspected Unapproved Parts in Aviation

  • 09 Oct 2023

Supply chain disruptions leading to shortages in aircraft parts can pose challenges to the aviation industry as it recovers post-pandemic. These shortages coupled with operational pressure to deliver products on time may lead organisations to seek suppliers through alternative sources, leading to increased risk of Suspected Unapproved Parts (SUPs) infiltrating our supply chains. Installing SUPs can lead to serious airworthiness implications and may compromise the reliability and safety of aircraft and aeronautical products. Read on to understand why and how the aviation maintenance community is doubling down to prevent SUPs from infiltrating the aviation supply chain. 

This article was originally published in The Leading Edge – a publication by the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) – in August 2003. Written by: Edmund Ong, Manager (Maintenance Organisation), Flight Standards Division, CAAS

Photo: CAAS

On  September 8, 1989,  a Convair CV-580 aircraft flying under  Norwegian Charter Airline Partnair Flight  394  broke apart in mid-air and crashed off the coast of Denmark, killing all 55 passengers and crew.  The investigators concluded that the crash was caused by improper maintenance and the use of counterfeit fasteners.

These counterfeit fasteners were installed on the structure that held the vertical fin and fuselage together. As they were not properly heat-treated during manufacture, they eventually gave way. As a result of this incident, the authorities began to initiate reforms and clamp down on counterfeit parts suppliers.

Today, as the aviation industry recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chain disruptions and the resultant shortages in aircraft parts, particularly raw materials and electronic components, can pose challenges to recovery efforts.  These shortages affect the ability of Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMOs)  to perform maintenance and repair work, and may eventually lead to delays in the delivery of aircraft and aeronautical products needed to support aircraft operations.

The shortage of aircraft parts coupled with operational pressure to deliver aeronautical products on time may lead organisations to seek suppliers through alternative sources, thus increasing the risk of Suspected Unapproved Parts (SUPs)  infiltrating our supply chains. When installed, SUPs can have serious airworthiness implications and may compromise the reliability and safety of aircraft and aeronautical products. The  Civil  Aviation  Authority of Singapore (CAAS) has been actively engaging stakeholders and emphasising the importance of enhancing their quality systems and processes to better detect and prevent SUPs from entering the system.

What are SUPs?

SUPs are any aircraft parts, including products, components or materials, from unknown or questionable origins. These SUPs are typically not manufactured, maintained or tested to meet airworthiness standards by qualified organisations and personnel. They are not approved and do not meet regulatory requirements for installation on aircraft or any aeronautical products. SUPs include, but are not limited  to the following:

  • parts that are not accompanied by authorised release  certificates or equivalent release  documents acceptable to the respective Civil  Aviation  Authorities,
  • parts that have  been  intentionally misrepresented, including counterfeit parts that are accompanied by falsified  release documentation,
  • new parts that were  manufactured in accordance with approved data and procedures by an approved manufacturer but did not pass  through an approved quality system and are not accompanied with proper documentation
  • used  or defective parts that were  not repaired or maintained in accordance with approved airworthiness data and procedures, or were repaired or maintained by unauthorised personnel, and
  • new or used  parts that originate from military  stocks that have  not been  shown to conform to approved design or data

Maintaining Vigilance Against SUPs

 The aviation community must continue to stay vigilant against SUPs and work together to mitigate any risk of SUPs entering our supply chain network. SUPs programmes within organisations that ensure only approved parts are used are key to achieving this. Consider the following factors when formulating an SUPs programme:

  • Reputable aircraft parts suppliers Dealing with reputable suppliers with good track records ensures that only approved aircraft parts are used on aircraft and aeronautical products. A comprehensive supplier evaluation framework is essential for the initial selection and ongoing assessment of suppliers that an organisation engages with.
  • Robust receiving inspection procedures Establishing robust incoming inspection procedures is crucial in identifying and rejecting SUPs before they enter an organisation’s supply chain system. The inspection procedures should verify that aircraft parts can be traced to approved manufacturers and suppliers, and are free from alteration, irregularities or damage. Supporting documentation, including airworthiness certificates, should also be reviewed against the aircraft parts to confirm traceability and authenticity.
  • Quarantine and timely reporting of SUPs When  SUPs are identified, they should be immediately quarantined, and the incident reported to the relevant authorities and type certificate holders. Reports to CAAS should be submitted within  72 hours.  Organisations may refer to CAAS Advisory Circular 1 – 4 on “Suspected Unapproved Parts”.

In addition, apart from efforts to detect SUPs, organisations should be responsible for ensuring that unairworthy, unsalvageable and life-limited aircraft parts do not resurface in the supply chain market as SUPs.  These parts should be properly mutilated and disposed of to prevent such occurrences.  

Recently, owing to the vigilance of the entire team,  one of our AMOs,  Thales Solutions Asia Pte Ltd (Thales), successfully detected a SUP when a member of the maintenance crew noticed anomalies in the identification data of an aircraft part. The team immediately surfaced the issue through their internal  SUPs process and confirmed that the aircraft component was a SUP.  The organisation also promptly reported this to CAAS to allow for timely investigation into the incident.

Combating SUPs to Safeguard Aviation Operations

 It will be a challenging battle against SUPs during this period of recovery, especially with more sophisticated SUPs surfacing from multiple sources. All stakeholders are essential in this fight against SUPs.  The aviation community should continue to collaborate and share industry knowledge to strengthen our systems, processes as well as safeguards. This will allow us to preserve the high safety standards established within the aviation industry and reinforce our collective commitment to the safety and reliability of our aviation operations.

      Thales: Vigilance Averts Potential Aviation Hazard

      In March  this year, Eddie Puah  and Ng  Jun Xiang, both  technical specialists at Thales, spotted an anomaly with a spare  part while  conducting their daily  tasks.  They immediately flagged it to their Line  Manager, Jeffrey Chan, as well as Thales’ Quality team.  Upon investigation, Thales decided to raise a SUP  alert to CAAS and other authorities, including the EU Aviation Safety  Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration.

      Both technical specialists were able to spot this anomaly due to their keen attention to detail and high level of skills training. They were also empowered to make the appropriate judgment call and bring it to their supervisor’s attention. Their actions, including looking out for the correct serial number and spotting previous non-conformant repairs, effectively prevented a faulty piece of equipment from entering the system and potentially jeopardising the health of an aircraft.

      This incident underscores Thales’ commitment in upholding the high safety standards expected of the aerospace industry. 

       

      An anomaly in the serial number was detected by a Thales maintenance crew. Further evaluation revealed that the Starter Generator was not processed or manufactured by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) in the company’s database. Photo: Thales Solutions Asia Pte Ltd 

      The Thales maintenance crew also found that the copper bar’s insulation did not conform to the required standards. Photo: Thales Solutions Asia Pte Ltd

      Thales Solutions Asia Pte Ltd, together with CAAS inspectors working on the case of the reported SUP. From Left: Melvin Lim, Eddie Puah, Daniel Wee (CAAS), Nick Ho, Alvin Leong (CAAS), Rebecca Liew, Ng Junxiang, Jeffrey Chan, Jeffrey Low. Photo: Thales Solutions Asia Pte Ltd

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